RESTREPO (Junger, Hetherington 2010)

[Chris Knipp]

Opens in NYC and LA June 25, other cities to follow.

This is my SFIFF 2010 review to start discussion because the documentary, which won a big prize at Sundance, went into US theatrical release today (June 25, 2010). With the US's endless Afghan "war" in the news after Gen. Chrystal's criticisms in Rolling Stone and forced resignation, people would do well to take a closer look at what the troops on the ground are doing. Opening of the review below. For the full review go here (http://www.filmleaf.net/showthread.php?2823-San-Francisco-International-Film-Festival-2010/page2#post24323). NB: the film can also be viewed on demand and was run by National Geographic. Restrepo now has lots of reviews and METACRITIC, summarizing these, gives the film a rating of 86. or "Universal acclaim." So, try to see it so you can discuss it intelligently.

Another note: this is the summer of blockbusters and junk, so you might think; yet today's NYTimes movie reviews show the six films -- mostly anything but mainstream or junky -- that opened in NYC today:
DOGTOOTH (provocative avantgardist film from Greece shown in ND/NF in NY in March)
GROWN UPS (Adam Sandler, Chris Rock comedy about superannuated teenagers, Metacritic 30)
I WAS BORN, BUT... (revival of a 1930's Yasujiro Ozu silent film at IFC Center)
RESTREPO (http://www.filmleaf.net/showthread.php?2823-San-Francisco-International-Film-Festival-2010/page2#post24323)
SOUTH OF THE BORDER (http://www.filmleaf.net/showthread.php?2862-SOUTH-OF-THE-BORDER-%28Oliver-Stone-2009%29) (Oliver Stone's left-leaning new doc, interviews with 7 South American heads of state -- previewed here yesterday)
WILD GRASS (http://www.filmleaf.net/showthread.php?2644-New-York-Film-Festival-2009&postid=22939#post22939) (French old master Alain Resnais' newest film, premiered in the US at NYFF 2009)
______________________________________



Sebastian Junger, Tim Hetherington: Restrepo (2010)

http://img32.imageshack.us/img32/1394/54546586.jpg


One platoon, one year, one valley goes this documentary's impressive slogan. Such concentrated focus is truly a selling point. This is vivid, intense, unvarnished stuff, and the two filmmakers won the Grand Jury Prize for documentary at Sundance this year for their troubles. Hetherington also won World Press Photo of the Year 2007 for an image of one of the soldiers resting at Restrepo, an outpost named after medic Juan Restrepo, one of their first casualties upon arriving at this dangerous place of daily combat, Afghanistan's Korangal Valley. The two embedded journalists, Sebastian Junger (of The Perfect Storm, with a contract from Vanity Fair for coverage) and distinguished British war photographer Tim Hetherington, are both filming the platoon off and on all through its 15-month deployment. They don't analyze or look at a wider context. They're in effect in the foxholes, where there are no atheists, and this time no military strategists either. What they show, and show well, is the camaraderie of this American Army unit, the Second Platoon, Battle Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade, their bravery, hard work, humor, and love of one another, and, less emphatic but also constant, a deteriorating relationship with the local citizenry. If you are going to make a narrative feature about how contemporary American soldiers in daily combat look and act, this is a good place to go, and the images are superb, and bravely shot, at the cost of physical injury and at the risk of getting shot like the soldiers. The film has no structure other than the actions of the platoon, their two big projects being building OP Restrepo, a 15-man outpost above the outpost that restricted the enemy's movements, and a foray dubbed Operation Rock Avalanche, during which the troops came under the heaviest fire; some of them still have nightmares from Avalanche.

The Korangal Valley is a scene in the middle of nowhere with no escape, as the soldiers saw it on arrival, with multiple daily engagements with a hidden enemy of snipers and pro-Taliban locals. Strategically, this place looks like it was useless. The Korangal Outpost was closed in 2009 after six years, hundreds of US wounded, and 50 US soldiers dead (and heavier losses on the less well equipped Afghan side). Some US military actually think the Korangal Outpost -- and the outpost of the outpost, O.P. Restrepo where most of the action takes place -- only increased local sympathy for the Taliban.

This is one "context" thing we get a glimpse of, because the film shows moments from a few of the weekly "shuras" when the platoon leader, Captain Keaney, met with local "elders," scrawny men of indeterminate age, often with brightly hennaed beards. He swears at them freely (safe, since they don't know English) and replies unceremoniously to their complaints. He's a combat officer, not a negotiator. At one point one of the locals' cows gets caught up in concertina wire (we do not see this) and the troops have to kill it (and eat it, from what we hear, and a very tasty meal it was). Elders come specially to complain about this, and demand a payment for the lost animal of four or five hundred dollars. Permission is refused for this from higher command and the elders leave with only the promise of rice and grain matching the weight of the cow. It looks as if the Afghans lose face in these "shuras," but the Americans don't gain anything.

Of course there is the inevitable clash when the Americans push so close they kill some Afghan civilians and wound some children. As with all wars against partisans or insurgents, the locals are all implicated. Captain Keaney is chagrined. But the captain -- he and a handful of the soldiers are shown interviewed later throughout the film, commenting on the experience and the major projects of the platoon -- is proud of the job they did, nonetheless. They gave the enemy a harder time than their predecessors. OP Restrepo, their initiative, gave them a strategic advantage in the valley. And the men were brave, even when they were scared, and they' were kind and loyal to each other.

Restrepo illustrates the Chris Hedges line that opens Kathryn Bigelow's similarly intense, visceral, but unanalytical fiction film, The Hurt Locker (http://www.cinescene.com/reviews/hurtlocker.htm), "The rush of battle is often a potent and lethal addiction, for war is a drug." Soldiers are shown hooting with excitement and saying that being fired upon is "better than crack," and they don't know if they can go back to civilian life after living day to day with such an adrenalin rush as the Konragal Valley and Operation Rock Avalance gave them.

The festival enthusiasm is not the end of it because Restrepo will be broadcast globally by National Geographic. But, reviewing the film at Sundance, Variety reviewer John Anderson argues, with some reason, that this documentary "needs a story, much like the war. The roaring lack of public interest in what the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan is largely due to a failure of storytelling: Tell us what it's about, and then we'll care." Will we? What the story of the US in Afghanistan looks like is being stuck in one place, fighting a pointless war, on varying pretexts, in impossible conditions, like Vietnam. Here we don't see the drugs and demoralization of Vietnam, though they may be there. The interviews give only a glimpse or two of the damage this deployment did on the 29 or so men -- as well as of what a very fine bunch of men they are. Michael Levine, the film's editor, who cut Venditti's great little doc Billy the Kid (http://www.chrisknipp.com/writing/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=953), deserves much credit for bringing some order to a wealth of chaotic material.

Seen at the San Francisco International Film Festival.

[Johann]

I watched an interview with the director on The National last night.
It should be pointed out that at the end of the interview he mentions that Afghanistan is not sustainable.

This is a film I want to see badly.
I want to see it for the unflinching combat footage with those Airborne guys (who did a fantastic job in establishing that high ground base).
Plus I want to see how the troops on the grounds' world contrasts with that of those who sent them there.
The director said that "most of them want to go back", that they can't reconcile the life on base with the combat zone.

This is the kind of military/war film we need.

[Chris Knipp]

I'd like to look up that interview on "The National" (i.e., CBC) -- more information, please. Which "director"? There are two, Tim Hetherington and Sebastian Junger. Junger, author of The Perfect Storm, has brought out a book from the Korangal Valley experience. It's included in Timothy Holder's Details Magazine ""Essential Summer Reading List." ("http://www.details.com/celebrities-entertainment/music-and-books/201005/essential-summer-reading-list-2010) It seems Junger is more pro-war than Hetherington so I'd like to know which guy it was.

But anyway, what does it mean that he said "Afghanistan is not sustainable"? What does he conclude from that? He could conclude that we need to step up the invasion, or that we should get out. Which are quite different.

Establishing that high base was certainly an achievement. But what was the point? Why do you conclude this is the kind of war film we need? I'm not certain about that. It's like THE HURT LOCKER. A vidid depiction of the soldier's work

[Chris Knipp]

I'd like to look up that interview on "The National" (CBC). Can you supply more information? Which of the two directors was it, Tim Hetherington or Sebastian Junger? Junger, author of The Perfect Storm, has brought out a book from the Korangal Valley experience. It's included in Timothy Holder's Details Magazine ""Essential Summer Reading List." (http://www.details.com/celebrities-entertainment/music-and-books/201005/essential-summer-reading-list-2010)
War, by Sebastian Junger [Twelve, $27]
The Perfect Storm author obviously has a thing for men in danger. In his long-awaited account of the 15 months he spent embedded with a U.S. platoon in eastern Afghanistan, he takes on the modern-day soldier. (May 11)
It seems Junger is more pro-war than Hetherington so I'd like to know which guy it was on CBC.

But anyway, what does it mean that he said "Afghanistan is not sustainable"? What does he conclude from that? Is the war non sustainable as currently conducted, or ever? He could conclude that we need to step up the invasion, or that we should get out. Which are quite different, needless to say!

Establishing that high base, the strategically stronger "outpost of the outpost," O.P. Restrepo, was certainly an achievement. But what was the point? Why do you conclude this is the kind of war film we need? I'm not certain about that. It's like THE HURT LOCKER. A vivid depiction of the soldier's work, but far from an examination of war, or even this war, in general.

A lot of the guys who talk to the camera back on base after the assignment seem in shock. It's hard to believe "most of them want to go back," but maybe they just are no longer able to function in other contexts, like Jeremy Renner's character in THE HURT LOCKER.

[Johann]

I'll post a link to it today. The interview was with Sebastian Junger. It's at the very end of the interview when he suggests that the mission is unsustainable unless certain things are implemented. I'll post a link to the interview so you can see/hear for yourself what he said.


The point of the base was to change the dynamics of (insurgent) power in that region. And they did it with that outpost.
It's "the kind of war film we need" because it shows the real shit, no varnish, no Hollywood touches.
You can only glean what it's all about by seeing in-theatre images, on the ground shots and sounds..
(and as a former soldier that's exactly what I need to determine for myself what's what, so maybe it's the war film "I" need..LOL)

I can't believe many of them want to go back either, but that's combat psychology, that's the gung-ho soldier within I think. But I could be wrong.
Maybe they're massively damaged upstairs, PTSD has set in, who knows.

More to post on this today as the National did a piece last night on Canadians in Afghanistan and I learned a lot about how futile this mission is.
I will explain later today.

[Johann]

Here's a link to the piece:

http://www.cbc.ca/video/player.html?category=News/TV_Shows/The_National&zone=national&site=cbc.ca&clipid=1542910594


and there's a fucking blackberry shitty advert in the middle of it!
I don't know why. Just ignore it if you can..
NO picture either..fucking corporate swine!

[Johann]

Last night The National profiled troops from 1PPCLI in Afghanistan (my Regiment and Battalion from back in the 90's) and it was depressing for me.
Why?

Well, it showed how futile it is trying to win "hearts and minds".
When your main objective is good relations with locals, what are you supposed to think when an Elder who knows you, supposedly "trusts" you and is your "friend" lets your squad wander right over to his own homemade IED's in a field and you lose a man for it. You're standing there staring in disbelief at this "Elder" who just let one of your own die, he KNEW there were IED's there and he didn't say a peep!
He just smiles at you?

And how about that Afghan soldier 2 days ago (trained by allies!) who tossed a grenade into a British basecamp and killed two troops?
This is your fucking "Friend???" You're "helping" these people???
You're training them in everything under the "Rise Up!" sun and they'd just as soon unload a magazine into your guts than get on with securing their country. Yee-ha. So GREAT. What fun.
What does that do to your resolve?
What does that do to your morale?
That's right: it's in the shitter.
Makes you wanna say: "Fuck these people. Get me on a Herc home ASAP"

[Chris Knipp]

Yes, the Restrepo O.P. was, as you say, to change the dynamic in the valley, and according to the film, it did. But they closed it without the dynamics of the valley being lastingly changed, as reported in the film. So it was ultimately deemed useless. So much for the whole enterprise. 43-44 US servicemen died there. RESTREPO is clear about all this. However, the film does not analyze the whole military strategy of the Afghan war or even of the Korangal Valley. The flmmakers were embedded with the troops. That does not normally lead to anti-war or detached coverage. It doesn't here. A unit in combat in constant danger for their lives are not pacifists. Hee-ya! As I said above, RESTREPO illustrates Bigelow's epigraph in THE HURT LOCKER, that war is intense and addictive, and nothing more.

Thanks at last for the link on the interview So the RESTREPO director (of the two) whom you heard on Canadian radio is Sebastian Junger: he is the more pro-war one. I linked to an article (http://www.ropeofsilicon.com/article/a-closer-look-at-sundance-favorite-restrepo)earlier claiming that RESTREPO in fact does doctor the material (to make the boys look innocent and vulnerable) and hence does have "Hollywood" touches, though adimittedly I wrote that it is "unvarnished stuff," and it does have that effect to be sure. The article was on "Rope of Silicon" and the writer was Bill Cody. It is called "A Closer Look at Sundance Favorite 'Restrepo.'" You'll find it here:

http://www.ropeofsilicon.com/article/a-closer-look-at-sundance-favorite-restrepo

Cody argues that Sundance got behind RESTREPO and in doing so supported a pro-war film, reversing their usual position. A comment on Cody's piece you'll find here. (http://www.opposingviews.com/i/restrepo-documentary-is-pro-afghan-war-despite-left-wing-praise) The title is "'Restrepo' Documentary is Pro-Afghan War, Despite Left-Wing Praise." I am wondering about the "left-wing praise." People don't know how to read film very well sometimes. They are seduced by the intensity of "actual" footage.

Advocates of a war can come across as critics of how it's being conducted. I think that's what you're getting with Junger.

If Junger said in the interview you heard that "the mission is unsustainable unless certain things are implemented" what he may be saying is, send in more troops, spend more money. In which case it's not a denial of the validity of the invasion but a questioning of its feasibility as currently conducted, and hence a call direct or indirect for reinforcements. (I'll have to watch or listen to some Junger interviews to say for sure about this though.)

Yes, "our" "friends" in Afghanistan are not "friends." They are often working for the Taliban, or for tribal chieftains. Anyway, "we" are killing their family members "by accident" so they don't see "us" as their friends either. You don't win "hearts and minds" by killing people. Doesn't anybody remember where the phrase "hearts and minds" came from? Vietnam. What happened in Vietnam? We lost We lost way more people and killed way more people in less time and then we got out. It was a failure.

It is ridiculous for the soldier to think locals are his allies in an invasion. The US pays millions of dollars in Afghanistan and Iraq to make locals their "allies." They're "allies" only as long as the money flows. The US in Iraq and Afghanistan is not "liberating" the locals from foreign invaders (like the Allies in Nazi-occupied Europe). They are "liberating" them from their cousins, who work for the Taliban. And they do took on Saturdays and Sundays. Or from the Sunnites, who married their cousins in the 1990's.

The assertion of Bill Cody is that RESTREPO or at least Junger is pro-Afghan war. I am putting this out there. I do not claim that it is fact. I have not yet seen interviews with Junger that he refers to, or listened to the one you linked to here. All I am saying, on the basis of a close watching of the film, is that RESTREPO is not an anti-war or anti-Afghan war, film. It is very much like THE HURT LOCKER. Which also I guess leftists fell over themselves to praise. War is a drug that appeals to everybody. Even "anti-war" types, it seems, can be seduced by an intense and uncritical depiction of war into believing it illustrates their point of view.

For a great anti-war film I always recommend THE BRIDGE/Die Brücke (1959).

[Johann]

If there's "doctored" material in it then I'm turned off. Why doctor it? Show it as it is, SHITHEADS! Why undermine your credibility?
You want to be known as a reputable journalist? Don't doctor shit!
That was the whole reason for my interest in it: unvarnished, undoctored, just REAL footage.
But I guess we can't even hope for that anymore, huh? It's all gotta be "spun".
The clips I saw from the film looked 1000% unvarnished, even the downtime shots w/ the troops

is Junger really Pro-war? How is he an advocate? I missed that.
He seems clinical with his apraisals of situations, without seeming pro or against, I thought he was just pro-troops. Restrepo is a film FOR the troops, isn't it?

Yes, the killing of families and others does not endear us to the Afghan people. They aren't "friends" by any stretch and it's totally understandable why.
You are in THEIR country, walking tall and being a jolly green giant who's "liberating" and "helping".
Locals have other ideas on that, and you shouldn't be surprised when fellow troops or you yourself take some hot metal in your guts.
Where the fuck are you?
What business are you conducting?
You think you're making a "difference"???
Keep telling yourself that over and over, Boy Scout.
Make sure your SOUL says it's worth it.
Don't come crying to anyone if you lose your legs. You signed up. You knew the risks. You knew the "mission".
RIGHT?
TROOP?

[Chris Knipp]

The "doctoring" comes in selecting a hundredth of the total footage you shot for your finished film. What do you select for? How can you make it vivid and appealing, full of human interest and still have that raw "unvarnished" look?

As I said, I'm citing Bill Cody. My own impression from the film is that it is, like THE HURT LOCKER, seduced by the excitement, and not an analysis of war, and hence, by indirect implication, pro-war. The jury is out on this. I have to watch Junger talk and then I'll give you my opinion.

[Johann]

The "excitement" of combat is retarded. I never understood that. The "Rush" or whatever it is.

I took part in many Live-Fire section attacks in my day and I never felt a "rush".
I always had to piss like a racehorse, because having tracers fly by your head (which make a very specific sound, BTW) scares the living fuck out of you. And when those rounds are coming from "friendlies" in training exercises...your adrenaline is up ten million units, just for the sheer terror of being capped by your platoon mate because he didn't check his ten to two...

In combat maybe it's another story. But I can't see myself getting pumped up because I was in a firefight with a "real" enemy.
I'd get pumped up if we won a major battle after a month, turning the tide in war, you know, strategic shit you can be proud of.
Who wants years and years of in-country? Years and years of fighting with no clear winner? I sure don't. Fuck that noise.
You want to conquer, like Alexander, or fucking Napoleon. You want VICTORY, muchacho.
If you can't see victory in your sights after all these years, PULL THE FUCKING PIN ON THE MISSION.

[Chris Knipp]

I watched your The National interview, also one with some right wing think tank suit on National Review. At least for the lady in Canada SJ shaved and put on a clean suit. And managed a faint smile at the end.

I did military service myself but was not in combat. I guess the conclusion must be you have to be there. SJ says combat is being all you can be, and brotherhood, and you deny a "rush" but then you say your adrenaline was up 100 times just in those training episodes. That's a rush. Just not as good a one as during 12 months of constant fighting in the most intense combat zone of the US war in Afghanistan.

As for SJ's conclusions vis-à-vis the Afghan invasion, he "reluctantly" says the capitals of Europe will not have the will (or the dough?) to add funding. In other words, he'd like to see the surge succeed -- he's "sorry" to have to predict it won't -- but he anticipates that ...blah blah blah.

I'm sorry, but what about this don't you understand? Junger is a combat (or "conflict") junkie. And he has to think it's worthwhile to have them, to go to war. But maybe he's not much of a strategic analyst. Maybe he'll become an armchair general when he retires. So Bill Cody is right: Sebastian Junger is pro-war. But as I've said already, he's into the nuts and bolts of war, the sweat and fear and exhilaration of the little stuff, the small victories, none of which are small at the time, despite your claim you'd only care about winning big -- "You want to conquer, like Alexander, or fucking Napoleon. You want VICTORY, muchacho.". Look, war is addictive (for some; not everybody of course). And as one who knows something about addiction, I can say you do it not for any result but because you like doing it. Recovering addicts like to quote the saying (attributed to Einstein, oddly enough), "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results." Get it? That's Iraq and Afghanistan, in a nutshell.

Sebastian Junger is not an ideologue. You have to interpret. But it's not difficult to see where he is.

To find someone clearly and positively critical of US policy in Afghanistan and who said all along (as did Robert Fisk and others that like the Russians we could never succeed there strategically due to the nature of the country) you need to go to Nir Rosen, whose 2008 Rolling Stone article, "How We Lost the War We Won," has vanished from the Rolling Stone files. He's still archived speaking on this topic on Democracy Now and other location (http://crooksandliars.com/cernig/nir-rosen-how-we-lost-war-we-won)s. All I can find now on Rolling Stone is 20 photos (http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/photos/18090/104479/) he took embedded with the Taliban for a little while observing the Taliban's freedom of movement and control of the countryside; he calls the region of Kabul as equivalent to the "Green Zone" of Iraq, a fantasy world. Nir Rosen looks local and dresses local. He has spent time in Iraq and was equally critical of US strategies there. Rosen argues that contrary to what many have said, "we" had a good chance of success in Afghanistan because people were so miserable, but we have lost it. We should withdraw, and negotiate with the Taliban, who he says are more moderate now and more willing to modify their policies. Nir Rosen sees the big picture; Junger never does for a minute. This is why whatever its virtues as showing the excitement of combat and how US Airborne ultra-gung-ho STRAC troops, I think analytical types of war documentary are more needed, such as NO END IN SIGHT.

[Johann]

I deny a rush for myself- I don't doubt for a minute that there are Xbox soldiers who get off on the intensity.
"Rush" denotes a thrill, fun, enjoyment. I had zero fun in those situations.
I find it hard to believe that 12-months or longer in a combat zone would provide thrilling "rushes" but then again, I don't get off on war or combat.
These guys are different animals...Airborne troops are usually more gung-ho than Line troops.

Junger is definitely not a strategic analyst. I guess I figured he was just a filmmaker who wanted to show the real shit, get the real perspective.
But are his motivations strictly to be "in combat" without actually serving in the military? to go on a joyride with Infantrymen?
If so, then sign up anyway Sebastian! You can be a journalist just like Joker in Full Metal Jacket! and a soldier! Win-Win! (just kidding- I know Junger doesn't have a military bone in his body)

I actually applaud Junger more so than Katherine Bigelow. (war junkies they both seem to be)
He risked his life for his film. (sorry, but he did- he could've had a bullet with his name on it at anytime over there)
My problem is what kind of help/point does this film give?
If the outpost was useless in the end, then isn't there a vain vibe over it all?
I'd hate for this film to just be a footnote on the war when so many guys died for that outpost.
It's like Hamburger Hill: a vital piece of land that needs to be secured, along with the stories of good men dying for a war they believe in winning but in the end.....it's......what?

How valuable is this film?

[Chris Knipp]

I think we understand each other. There's a rush but you and I have not experienced it. But so what? Coverage of war should include the long aftermath, the life of the veteran. RESTREPO is very edited. There is lots of stuff they don't choose to show. It's still flavorful, though. And you're right, Hetherington and Junger were in physical danger making RESTREPO, as I said in my original review -- as Kathryn Bigelow wasn't making THE HURT LOCKER in Hollywood's one-size-fits-all version of the Middle East, Morocco. But so what? Why did the Korengal Valley need to be secured? I still don't know. But for that matter, why does Afghanistan need to be secured? It would have been better to negotiate with the Taliban than to play the Nam-like game of putting in a puppet, Hamid Karzai. It's a fantasy Green Zone world there. Unfortunately, Americans are all too happy with such worlds, insecure when abroad in an unsecured un-Americanized zone where people drink arak instead of Coca Cola. In fact, does Obama know any more about war than Bush II did?

To find someone clearly and positively critical of US policy in Afghanistan and who said all along (as did Robert Fisk and others) that like the Russians we could never succeed there strategically -- due to the whole nature of the country -- you need to go to Nir Rosen, whose 2008 Rolling Stone article (http://www.lawandsecurity.org/get_article/?id=107), "How We Lost the War We Won," has vanished from the Rolling Stone files. He's still archived speaking on this topic on Democracy Now and other location (http://crooksandliars.com/cernig/nir-rosen-how-we-lost-war-we-won)s. All I can find now on Rolling Stone is 20 photos (http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/photos/18090/104479/) he took embedded with the Taliban for a little while observing the Taliban's freedom of movement and control of the countryside; he describes the region of Kabul as equivalent to the "Green Zone" of Iraq, a fantasy world. Nir Rosen looks local and dresses local. He has spent time in Iraq and was equally critical of US strategies there. Rosen argues that contrary to what many have said, "we" had a good chance of success in Afghanistan because people were so miserable, but we have lost it. We should withdraw, and negotiate with the Taliban, who he says are more moderate now and more willing to modify their policies. Nir Rosen speaking in this Democracy Now interview with Amy Goodman in mid-October 2008, during the presidential campaign, says Iraq turned bad, and Obama needed a substitute "good" war, so he chose Afthanistan. But even if by some miracle there we turned it into "Sweden," there's still Pakistan. (Incidentally a NYTimes Magazine article just says Yemen is the next Afghanistan.)

Nir Rosen sees the big picture; Junger and Hetherington, in RESTREPO, never do for a minute. That is not their aim nor would it be particularly appropriate to the job they are doing as journalists embedded with the 125th Airborne in Afghanistan in a valley that's essentially in the middle of nowhere. This is why whatever its virtues as showing the excitement of combat and how US Airborne ultra-gung-ho STRAC troops fight and live bravely as brothers, I think analytical types of war documentary are more needed, such as NO END IN SIGHT. I had to track down Nir Rosen's 2008 Rolling Stone article on Afghanistan, entirled (not his title he has said) "How We Lost the War We Won," archived (http://www.lawandsecurity.org/get_article/?id=107)on the website of the NYU Center for Law and Security.

[Johann]

Junger's views are probably very much colored by his time documenting the troops on film. That's the experience he knows.

For him to go for the bigger picture would possibly damage his own film I think.
If I was a soldier who was one of the ones in his film, I'd feel betrayed by anything less than total dedication to the Grunt- "screw the headshed guys! screw the Tiny Masters who sent us! Groundpounders are all that matter, Junger! You were in the shit with us! You bleed Green! ha ha ha

He's kind of obligated to toe the "troop line" on this one. He can't get too political just by the nature of what he did. Pigeonholed!

Too bad Rolling Stone magazine just wants to be SEEN as a cutting edge rag and has to delete important archives.
You have such important reporting and you bury it?
Rolling Stone is flavor-of-the-month bullshit. Always has been. They just want to appear hip and current. No Backbone, please!...

I have no doubt in my fiery brain that Afghanistan is Lost. All those dead troops and all that $$$ spent for what? ZILCH. Sad, huh?
What have we learned?

[Chris Knipp]

Yes, the combat soldiers deserve an intimate account. But we the people whose government is waging this war deserve a documentary about the larger strategies. I guess you answered your question; RESTREPO is a postcard from the grunts. With what looks like all the details even though it's only a small percentage of the footage shot.

We, however, need a documentary about the strategies of the US involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and the forty other countries where we're conducting the contemporary equivalent of the War on Communism, the "International War on Terror." I.e., the pursuit of empire.

Obviously the 125th Airborne is doing its job -- with distinction. But they are part of a larger strategy that is doomed to failure.

I'm still puzzled about the disappearcnce of Nir Rosen's Rolling Stone piece about the Taliban from 2009. You'd think it would turn up archived somewhere but it's as if it's been scrubbed clean. Will the magazine "lose" the explosive article about McChrystal that got him fired in a couple years too? Anyway I can refer you to a a more recent analytical Nir Rosen piece (http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php) about US strategy in Afghanistan, "Something from Nothing," from the Boston Review Jan.-Feb. 2010 issue. COIN (coinsurgency) is a key element in current strategy:

In a near-fanatical fight for influence, proponents of COIN spent much of the past decade exhorting the U.S. military and government to embrace the strategy in the global war on terrorism. COIN shaped the “Surge” in Iraq in 2007, and its alleged success in reducing violence earned its military proponents a dominant role in strategic thinking. COIN’s biggest proponent is General David Petraeus, who is credited with designing the Surge and now oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as head of Central Command. Petraeus coauthored the latest edition of The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, a seminal book in the COIN community. The Field Manual cites the view of “General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong’s central committee . . . that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military.” According to the Field Manual, 'such an assertion is arguable and certainly depends on the insurgency’s stage of development; it does, however, capture the fact that political factors have primacy in COIN' (emphasis added).

Nir Rosen has repeatedly argued that the "surge" in Iraq was not a success; that other factors just happened to make it look like one. Another important paragraph from Rosen's Boston Review Jan.-Feb. 2010 article

In Afghanistan, there is no comparable exhaustion of the population, more than two-thirds of which lives in hard-to-reach rural areas. In addition, population protection—the core of COIN—is more complicated in Afghanistan. The Taliban only attack Afghan civilians who collaborate with the Americans and their puppet government or who are suspected of violating the extremely harsh interpretation of Islamic law that many Afghans accept. And unlike in Iraq, where innocent civilians were targeted only by predatory militias, civilians in Afghanistan are as likely to be targeted by their “own” government as by paramilitary groups. Afghanistan has not fallen into civil war—although tension between Pashtuns and Tajiks is increasing—so the United States cannot be its savior. You can’t build walls around thousands of remote Afghan villages; you can’t punish the entire Pashtun population, the largest group in the country, the way the minority Sunnis of Iraq were punished.

I would recommend reading that paragraph carefully, and reading the whole article. Why is American fighting in Afghanistan, when al-Qaeda is more firmly ensconced in Pakistan? That's one of Nir Rosen's questions. Nir Rosen shows you can be on the ground with the grunts -- and the enemy -- and still cover strategy and ask big questions.

The important thing is to ask questions. RESTREPO is a vivid documentary about US soldiers in combat, and has been rewarded for that with a couple of festival prizes, but it doesn't ask questions.

We need a documentary about COIN, through history, with special focus on Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

[Johann]

Yes, the combat soldiers deserve an intimate account. But we the people whose government is waging this war deserve a documentary about the larger strategies. I guess you answered your question; RESTREPO is a postcard from the grunts. With what looks like all the details even though it's only a small percentage of the footage shot.

We, however, need a documentary about the strategies of the US involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and the forty other countries where we're conducting the contemporary equivalent of the War on Communism, the "International War on Terror." I.e., the pursuit of empire.

Obviously the 125th Airborne is doing its job -- with distinction. But they are part of a larger strategy that is doomed to failure.


I agree 100%. We definitely need a documentary on the larger strategies. If governments want 100% support from the people on wars, then what's so hard about allowing filmmakers to get the skinny? To bring something tangible on celluloid about the issues here?

In our dumbed-down society no one will really care anyways about dead-bang on op-ed films- look at how ignored Michael Moore is! What do you got to lose?? HUH?? Only people with a conscience will be looking for that shit anyway! what do you have to lose, Obama?!?!Harper?!?!?!


I must say that I still want to see RESTREPO (will try to see it here sometime soon) and that I think these kinds of films are valuable to shed light.
How much light? That's up for debate. It could be only a 30-second part of a 2 hour movie that could make a lightbulb go off in your head about something! TRUE!

I am pro-soldier. I really am, believe it or not.
It's not the Man you send to war- it's the WAR ITSELF. The men are fine- they can deal with fallout on just about anything. (A military phrase is "adapt and overcome".
It's about time we had some Generals and Leaders in Power who really gave a shit and weren't just punching the career clock.
Who had ideas and contingencies with high probablities of success, based on all gathered intelligence.
From where I sit, this is a gigantic clusterfuck with no one who knows what's going on. And if they do, they aren't doing anything to get on track or correct the trajectory of this expensive "Heart & Mind winning".

[Chris Knipp]

I don't know what it would mean to be pro-soldier or anti-soldier. One is pro- or anti- the policies or directives of the generals and the world leaders.

On the other hand, do you like cops? So I'm not very aligned with the rah rah outlook that makes a young man join the Marines. But sometimes soldiers are needed. We ought to have a draft. Then we'll find out if people want these wars. I joined the military myself, but I did it to avoid being drafted.

After all this discussion, of coruse I think you would have to see RESTREPO. It is, in its way, a strong film. It is a vivid picture, as I've said before, of what American soldiers look like and act like in this century and a glimpse of what fighting in Afghanistan is like. Anyway, I'd want to see it. I chose to see it, out of all the SFIFF films this year.

I quoted Anderson of Variety at Sundance:
But, reviewing the film at Sundance, Variety reviewer John Anderson argues, with some reason, that this documentary "needs a story, much like the war. The roaring lack of public interest in what the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan is largely due to a failure of storytelling: Tell us what it's about, and then we'll care."

[Johann]

Let me clarify:

I'm Pro- "having a patriot-sign-up to fight for his homeland at all costs/as long as the LEADER sending this noble soul into battle has got HIS SHIT TOGETHER"- is that better?

You make sure that war is Worth It, Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. President.
If not, you should be tied to a stake and shot by the Best that you sent in to do the WORST.

The point I'm making is that I'm all for going to war when you have a legitimate, VALID reason. When it's absolutely necessary.

Doesn't Afghanistan have a PIPELINE going right though it? Enough said.
War is MONEY, remember...

And no, as a rule I don't like cops. I don't like police. They have a "cocky gene" that makes me want to torch their cruisers just like those protesters did at the G20.
I do want protection/help from them if they gave it without prejudice, but they don't. (At least not in Toronto)
You can become a double victim real quick with this city's police...

[Chris Knipp]

Does Afghanistan have a pipeline? Yes, The Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAP or TAPI) is a proposed natural gas pipeline being developed by the Asian Development Bank (Wikipedia here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Afghanistan_Pipeline)): The pipeline will transport Caspian Sea natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan and then to India.and it's said that the US invasion has been the unique factor enabling the construction of this pipeline to go forward. But the new thing is that Afghanistan has a lot of other mineral wealth: The NY Times published "U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan," June 13, 2010, an article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html) about this, which was, of course, only released strategically at this time (not really new information). Oil reserves in Afghanistan? I don't think so. But the country could be strategic for access to Asian oil.

Right wing pro-empire people don't care why we're at war. They know it's just good to be at war. It shows we're on top. It builds empire. It's good for business. It gives uneducated boys jobs. It distracts the public. It's exciting. Something to root for.

The development of a sensible U.S. energy policy would obviate the perceived need to dominate other countries. " Quote from Professor Marjorie Cohn of the Thomas Jefferson School of Law on "Jurist Legal Intelligence." (http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew41.php) But that's wrong. There is always the need to dominate other countries. See Chalmbers Johnson's Blowback Triology.

Mr President's and Mr Prime Minister's wars are always worth fighting. They'll find a reason. Usuall several. See Iraq.

But just to bring us back to topic: this is not discussed in RESTREPO. Why are they there? They don't know. They only know it's the middle of nowhere, and it's very dangerous, and it's their job.

[Chris Knipp]

Heads up on the Nir Rosen article from Rolling Stone, October 2008, "How We Lost the War We Won: A Journey into Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan." Though it has disappeared from the Rolling Stone website, it is archived on the NYU Center fon Law and Security website here. (http://www.lawandsecurity.org/get_article/?id=107) I also linked it for my original mention of it above. It's an 8,400-word article, but I highly recommend it for the assessment of US chances against the Taliban in Afghanistan. He argues that they can not be beaten militarily. He advocates negotiating with them. But the COIN plan works on the theory that "we" can go around them and "win the hearts and minds" of Afghans against them. Nir Rosen dresses like an Afghan, wears a long beard, studied the language, travels with "midlevel" Taliban leaders. Going for a somewhat abortive and certainly dangerous lone expedition with Taliban accompaniment into the remote countryside, Rosen finds the Taliban more moderate than during their years of rule, willing to let women study and work and open to using once-banned modern technologies now, but also leaner and meaner, with heightened attack and survival skills. They're also nationalists, uninterested in outside alliances, regarding Al Qaeda as friendly but not local, former guests, no longer around, whose methods involve killing too many Muslims to approve of. Rosen is advised, presciently, that elections won't change anything. The Taliban are everywhere but the Green Zone-like region of Kabul, and control everything not run by the ruthless and irresponsible tribal leaders and young jihadists who've abandoned tribal values.


"This can't be solved other than by talking to the Taliban," says a top diplomat in Kabul. A leading aid official adds that it is important to understand the ideological goal of the Taliban: "They don't have an international-terrorist agenda — they have an Afghanistan agenda. We might not agree with their agenda for the country, but that's not our war." Former Taliban leaders agree that only talks will end the war. "If the U.S. deals with Pakistan and negotiates with higher-level Taliban," says one, "then it could reach a deal."

And then we have:

The Bush administration believes it can stop the Taliban by throwing money into clinics and schools. But even humanitarian officials scoff at the idea. "If you gave jobs to the Viet Cong, would they stop fighting?" asks one. "Two years ago you could build a road or a bridge in a village and say, 'Please don't let the Taliban come in.' But now you've reached the stage where the hearts-and-minds business doesn't work."

And finally:

Officials on the ground in Afghanistan say it is foolhardy to believe that the Americans can prevail where the Russians failed. At the height of the occupation, the Soviets had 120,000 of their own troops in Afghanistan, buttressed by roughly 300,000 Afghan troops. The Americans and their allies, by contrast, have 65,000 troops on the ground, backed up by only 137,000 Afghan security forces — and they face a Taliban who enjoy the support of a well-funded and highly organized network of Islamic extremists. "The end for the Americans will be just like for the Russians," says a former commander who served in the Taliban government. "The Americans will never succeed in containing the conflict. There will be more bleeding. It's coming to the same situation as it did for the communist forces, who found themselves confined to the provincial capitals."

That was all written when Bush was still President. But is anything significantly different? I'm waiting for Nir Rosen's next Afghan piece. His articles are few and far between, but no one I know of has written more cogently or straightforwardly about the US's post-9/11 Middle Eastern takeover schemes. It was too late for Bush's "quiet surge" and it will also be too late for
for Barack Obama's plan for a more robust reinforcement — to work in Afghanistan. More soldiers on the ground will only lead to more contact with the enemy, and more air support for troops will only lead to more civilian casualties that will alienate even more Afghans. Sooner or later, the American government will be forced to the negotiating table, just as the Soviets were before them.

Nir Rosen reported again on Afghanistan in the Jan.-Feb. issue of Mother Jones. His article (http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/obama-afghanistan-stoner-cops) is called "In the Land of the Soner Cops." More about COIN (counerinsurgency) and the difficulty of making it work without massive funding and support.

[Johann]

Outstanding stuff Chris.
Much thanks.

Restrepo opens here in Toronto in a limited engagement this week. A review is in Now magazine with extensive quotes from Junger.
The review said that it does have elements of a Hollywood war movie. I'll post again on this tomorrow with direct references.

Restrepo is about one platoon in one year in one area of Afghanistan. Junger is quoted as saying that they always had good cover, so they were always able to make a go of a well-made film. (no berzerker-jumpy shots of just boots & gravel in some trench)
Looking forward to seeing it for myself.

[Chris Knipp]

Okay. We'll see. US reviews continue to be very favorable.

Some quotes from reviews and my comments:
Stripped to a minimum of editorializing (but, like "The Hurt Locker," flush with sympathy)--TIME OUT NEW YORK. Actually a lack of editorializing = flush with sympathy. No "but" necessary.


The movie premiered in January at the Sundance Film Festival, too soon to include a tragic denouement: in April the U.S. command surrendered the Korangal Valley to the Taliba--CHICAGO READER.. Perhaps less a "tragic denoument" than a logical outcome.


Junger and Hetherington take our conflicted ideas about war and its let's-make-a-man-out-of-you purpose and throw them in our faces, in a way "Hurt Locker" never does. --SALON.COM Not sure how this happens, if so, but the home-base talking-head dialogue may indeed provide perspective HURT LOCKER can't.


What Restrepo does so dramatically, so convincingly, is make the abstract concrete, giving the soldiers on the front lines faces and voices. --LA TIMES. Fancy way of saying that this shows as I keep saying just what US soldiers look like now.


The film is a nearly unrelenting nightmare. Even interviews shot with the survivors after the fact have a current of dread.--NEW YORK MAGAZINE Not "even" the interviews: particularly the interviews. It's they that provide "a current of dread," not the combat sequences.


It's doubtful you'll ever see a combat documentary that channels the chaos of war as thoroughly as this one.--ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY. As I said in my review, the film has "no structure other than the actions of the platoon. " And hence it appears chaotic, and is more exhausting to watch than if it had clearer payoffs.

[Chris Knipp]

Norman Wilner's review (http://www.nowtoronto.com/movies/story.cfm?content=175932) in the Toronto publication "Now" ends with a callous statement:
Post-tour interviews with a handful of soldiers offer additional perspective on the trauma of combat, but we don’t really need them. That distress comes across with nightmarish clarity. So we don't need to know what happens to the soldiers after the combat duty is over? That they continue to have constant nightmares? That they don't anticipate being functional in other environments? Whether or not there's a recovery is essential information, context. People don't even want that small amount of "additional perspective" to be provided! As it is, documentary filmmakers are often in too much of a hurry (not always). Of course Junger and Hetherington did film for the whole 12-15-month period of deployment, but followups much later are nice. That's what makes Michael Apted's 7-14-21-35 "Up" series so exceptional and revelatory about the nature of human experience. Most of us must survive to endure "the long littleness of life."

[Johann]

You posted on Wilner's review already- great.
He's a dismissive guy, huh?

[Chris Knipp]

I read Wilner's review because you referred to it. You never link to anything but it wasn't hard to find. I don't know anything about Wilner as a reviewer but I just thought that remark that "we don't really need" the "post-tour interviews" was insensitive toward the soldiers and the whole context of the war and of War, assuming the film is trying to provide a three-dimensional view of the Americans fighting in Afghanistan. Or, sorry -- not "fighting" -- "winning hearts and minds."

They say a picture is worth a thousand words. Yes and a thousand words can be worth a thousand pictures, too, when it comes to actual specific information as opposed to merely wallowing in a "visceral" experience that you don't understand.

I don't know if I would call Wilner "dismissive." It may have been inadvertent. He was meaning to praise the completeness of the experience RESTREPO provides simply in its combat, on-assignment coverage, and not meant to dismiss the "post-tour interviews" so much as to say they were icing on the cake. However this may indicate a tendency at hasty writing that could lead to the effect of dismissiveness.

[Chris Knipp]

One of his pieces that I read before I began to know who Nir Rosen was is his 2004 Falluja article (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/07/05/040705fa_fact) in The New Yorker, whose title is "Home Rule: A Dangerous Excursion into the Heart of the Sunni Opposition." The concluding line is "As the handover to sovereignty began, the experiment with self-rule in Falluja looked more and more like a desperate measure that had been taken too late." "Dangerous excursion" is a title that describes not only a failed American experiment but a lot of Nir Rosen's projects as a reporter, which are noted for unusual access into surroundings closed to westerners and accounts of on-the-ground events in direct language, which, however, never get lost in detail: his situation analysis is as blunt and clear as his descriptions of close calls. This piece provides information about the fallout from the Falluja massacre, the first time we started to hear a lot about Blackwater. Nir Rosen is generally honest and clear about the circumstances of his pieces and how he was able to get his information, as this passage indicates:
I was able to avoid being taken hostage or killed because I speak Arabic and have olive skin and black hair and, when asked, I said that I was Bosnian. I didn’t carry my American passport into Falluja. More important, I was travelling with a Palestinian who had helped the resistance leaders during the fighting. This reassured the men in the white sedan. Nir Rosen is a tough reporter (even physically burly) who grew up in Israel and speaks Arabic. His features and hair and linguistic skills help him to blend in. All this and his unusually cogent and clear-eyed run-downs on prospects and strategies speaking in person to interviewers or at teaching institutions explain why he's become the younger generation on-the-ground person I most respect for reportage and analysis in English of the US wars in the Middle East.

Nir Rosen is an Iranian American born in NYC in 1977 associated with the New America Foundation and the NYU Center on Law and Security. He's written for The New York Times Magazine, Harpers, The New Yorker, Rolling Stone, Boston Review, and Mother Jones. His two-plus years in Iraq during the US invasion led to his 2006 first book, In the Belly of the Green Bird: the Triumph of the Martyrs. Rosen's views are available in person in online videos of talks and interviews.

[Chris Knipp]

Before I knew who Nir Rosen was (but the onion of his identity is still being peeled) I plunged into his 2004 Falluja article (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/07/05/040705fa_fact) in The New Yorker, whose title is "Home Rule: A Dangerous Excursion into the Heart of the Sunni Opposition." The concluding line is, "As the handover to sovereignty began, the experiment with self-rule in Falluja looked more and more like a desperate measure that had been taken too late." It read like a harsh but up-close and realistic view.

"Dangerous excursion" is a title that describes not only a failed American experiment but a lot of Nir Rosen's projects as a reporter, which are noted for unusual access into surroundings closed to westerners and accounts of on-the-ground events in direct language, which, however, never get lost in detail: his situation analysis is as blunt and clear as his descriptions of close calls. The New Yorker piece provides information about the fallout from the Falluja massacre, the first time we started to hear a lot about Blackwater. Nir Rosen is generally honest and clear about the circumstances of his pieces and how he was able to get his information, as this passage indicates:


I was able to avoid being taken hostage or killed because I speak Arabic and have olive skin and black hair and, when asked, I said that I was Bosnian. I didn’t carry my American passport into Falluja. More important, I was travelling with a Palestinian who had helped the resistance leaders during the fighting. This reassured the men in the white sedan. Nir Rosen is a tough reporter (even physically burly) who grew up partly in Israel and, as he says, speaks Arabic; evidently Hebrew and some Bosnian as well. His features and hair and linguistic skills help him to blend in. All this and his left-leaning but always independent views, often expressed in person to interviewers or in educational settings, explain why he's become one of the most interesting younger Mideast reporters writing in English.

Who is Nir Rosen? He is an Iranian American, so Wikipedia tells it; he is also Jewish; he was born in NYC in 1977, and is now is associated with the New America Foundation and the NYU Center on Law and Security. He is now married, with a child, and is listed as living in Lebanon, though he seems to turn up regularly in New York. Used to hiding his true identity to save his skin (or his head) in war zones, he also tends to appear of indeterminate origin also when Stateside. A key may be time spent in Israel. Counterpunch originally published Nir Rosen's piece (http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles/NirRosen.htm), "This Broken Home: Revisiting Israel," about his 2001 return, for the first time in three years, to the area where he spent summers in his childhood. This piece is no longer to be found on Counterpunch's website. Rosen seems in the piece to be saying farewell to allegiances. He confesses to once wanting to join an elite Israeli military corps. Instead as a more grown up twenty-something visiting the land where his mother lives and feeling alienated by it, he rejects Israeli's artificial and paranoid existence along with Zionism and Judaic orthodoxy, and describes religion in general as 'backward." Likewise as time went on and he matured rapidly as a reporter and commentator, he rejected, by demolishing it in print, the smug orthodoxy of Bush imperialism.

On Iraq Bloggers Central David Adesnik reports (http://jarrarsupariver.blogspot.com/2006/11/education-of-nir-rosen.html) Rosen was a "scrawny" boy who could draw anything if you gave him a pencil and paper, who got in trouble with authority in school; who turned up thick and muscular as a adult, and bypassed the cub reporting route, instead working as a bouncer in Washington while awaiting the opportunity to jump-start a journalistic career by going straight to the front lines of a hot new war. That war was the 2003 Iraq invasion, when he was 26. He's written for The New York Times Magazine, Harpers, The New Yorker, Rolling Stone, Boston Review, The New Republic, World Policy Journal, Time, Salan, and Mother Jones. His two-plus years in Iraq during the US invasion led to his 2006 first book, In the Belly of the Green Bird: the Triumph of the Martyrs, subsequently reissued in paperback as The Triumph of the Martyrs: A Reporter's Journey into Occupied Iraq. He has also reported from Somalia, Jordan, and Pakistan. There is a certain brutality in Nir Rosen's analyses of the US in the Mideast. But there is also the tenderness of one who blends in, looks, and listens, observing even the humble, miserable Iraqi refugee who lives in the stinking mud in a tarp-covered hut built out of abandoned TV sets.

In the next life, the one in which I'll live my childhood dream of being a foreign correspondent, I want to grow up to be like Nir Rosen.

Video interviews with Nir Rosen: About Al Qaeda (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8q7KFHxNylg) (Jan. 2010); About Afghanistan (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH6pcbdN2vE) (Sept. 2009).

http://img28.imageshack.us/img28/4387/nir.jpg
Nir Rosen [Guardian, UK]

[Chris Knipp]

http://a.imageshack.us/img808/7595/keating316.jpg
Bob Strong/Reuters (From the NY Times)
A soldier at Combat Outpost Keating in eastern Afghanistan scanned
a ridge after mortar shells were fired at insurgents in January 2009.

No better story from the WikiLeaks revelations (http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary,_2004-2010) of 92,000 Afghan war reports ("Afghan War Diaries, 2004 to 2010") to provide context for RESTREPO than C.J. Chivers' July 26, 2010 NY Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26keating.html), "Strategic plans spawned a bitter end for a lonely outpost." Outpost Keating was not high and strategic like Restrepo OP but low and exposed like the one from which the Restrepo troops moved up from.
But the outpost’s fate, chronicled in unusually detailed glimpses of a base over nearly three years, illustrates many of the frustrations of the allied effort: low troop levels, unreliable Afghan partners and an insurgency that has grown in skill, determination and its ability to menace. The Americans at outpost Keating gradually realized that despite their optimism about winning goodwill among the locals with handouts of milk and soccer balls and friendly contacts, the insurgents controlled everything. Ultimately after a local leader who cooperated with the Americans in shuras was killed and others were menaced, the outpost underwent a brutal assault in which eight US soldiers were killed and two dozen wounded. The outpost was closed and evacuated so quickly some weaponry and ammunition were left, which were looted by the insurgents.

If a film crew could have covered the final attack on Keating outpost and the evacuation, it would have been a more intense and dramatic story than RESTREPO, intense and dramatic though RESTREPO is. The picture that emergers from this NY Times summary is of a network of beleaguered and isolated US troop outposts scattered around remote areas of Afghanistan, fed inadequately by helicopters and undermanned and inadequately supplied. Meanwhile, there is more and more reliance on drones by the US forces, and the drones are less successful than government reports would indicate both in achieving their missions and in avoiding Afghan and US casualties. And the WikiLeaks documents do not cover Top Secret material, or information about Special Forces activities in the country.

The NY Times summaries confirm that these documents don't contradict government reports but show that the situation has been bleaker then reported and Washington has concealed key information such as the insurgents' use of heat-seeking missiles to down US aircraft, problems with drones the extent and nature of drone use, and some other details. Specific documents such as messages sent out by troops at the Keating outpost show desperation and inadequate support in a direct and almost intimate way.

Restrepo OP had a more advantageous physical location, but also allowed less contact with locals. It was not so brutally destroyed, but it eventually was eliminated.

Bill Doskoch's blog also suggests (http://www.billdoskoch.ca/2010/07/25/restrepo-wikileaks-and-afghanistan/) reading this Keating outpost story in relation to Restrepo in an entry entitled, "‘Restrepo,’ WikiLeaks and Afghanistan."

http://a.imageshack.us/img714/4880/keatingfuneral316.jpg
Stephen Morton/Getty Images (From the NY Times)
Friends and relatives at the funeral of Staff Sgt. Vernon W. Martin,
one of the eight soldiers killed on Oct. 3, 2009, in the outpost’s final battle.

[Chris Knipp]

AFGHANISTAN

As the sensational WikiLeaks revelations become wider known and people rethink the Afghan war (or simply become sensitized to its existence again, if that's even possible, after nine years of numbing out), I again recommend looking at Nir Rosen's coverage and analysis of Afghanistan:

Nir Rosen articles.

How We Lost the War We Won: A Journey into Taaliban-Controlled Afghanistan (originally in Rolling Stone, (http://www.lawandsecurity.org/get_article/?id=107) October 30, 2008). I now see there's a debate about the piece in which Nir participated on Small Wars Journal. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/an-american-journalist/)

The Broken State, in The National, (http://thenational.ae/article/20081128/REVIEW/861067314/1043) Nov. 28, 2008.

In the Land of the Stoner Cops. In Mother Jones (http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/obama-afghanistan-stoner-cops), Jan-Feb. 2010 issue.

Something from Nothing: US Strategy in Afghanistan, also Jan.-Feb 2010, in the Boston Review (http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php).

Before we even went into Aghanistan after 9/11, Robert Fisk, the Independent's Middle East correspondent, had several powerful pieces about the historical futility of all foreign invasions of this rugged country, but I'll have to hunt to find those. Afghanistan is "The graveyard of empires." He is and has always been eloquent on this subject. Here are two by Fisk:

Robert Fisk articles.

Just Who Are Our Allies in Afghanistan? Independent UK. (http://www.matrixmasters.com/wtc/fisk/newally/newally.html), Oct 3, 2001.

Forget the Clichés, There is No Easy Way for the West to Sort This Out, Independent, UK. (http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1117-03.htm), Nov 17, 2001.

Here's one of Fisk's key points from this second article:
The real problem is that Afghanistan contains only tiny minorities of the ethnic groups which constitute its population. Thus, the 7 million Pashtuns in the country are outnumbered by the 12 million Pashtuns in Pakistan, the 3.5 million Tajiks in Afghanistan are outnumbered by the 6 million Tajiks in Tajikistan. The 1.3 million Uzbeks are just a fraction of the 23 million Uzbeks in Uzbekistan. There are 600,000 Turkmens in Afghanistan – but 3.52 million in Turkmenistan. So why should the Afghan Pashtuns and Tajiks and Uzbeks and Turkmens regard Afghanistan as their country? Their "country" is the bit of land in Afghanistan upon which they live.

[Johann]

NO BETTER STORY INDEED.
I let out a yelp over the surfacing of these documents.
So awesome that someone said "FUCK IT. I"M LETTING THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!"
WikiLeaks is the Maverick America needs, not that fossil John McCain. ha ha

[Chris Knipp]

Well, it may be what America needs, but of course WikiLeaks is in London, and the founder is Australian. Maybe the world needs them. Apparently there is a similar site in New York called Cryptome.org (http://cryptome.org/). Browse away. And there's 2600: The Hacker Quaterly, headed by "Emmanuel Goldstein" (a pseudonym or nom de guerre) organizer of the HOPE (Hackers On Planet Earth) Conference, which Julian Assange was supposed to attend. And I guess we need to know about Bradley Manning, the soldier who is in prison for hacking into US Afghan war information, and Julian Lamo, the former hacker who turned him in. And "Collateral Murder," the video (http://911blogger.com/news/2010-04-06/collateral-murder-video-wikileaks-assange-and-glenn-greenwald-interviewed-democracy-now), its authenticity confirmed by the US military, of US soldiers (NB: in Iraq not Afghanistan) indiscriminately killing 12 people and wounding two children, their chilling conversation treating their actions as if it were a video game, falsely identifying the innocent civilians as armed, laughing and saying "nice," when the killing is done. Their euphemism for kill is "engage." After the killing when a van comes to rescue the wounded, they kill the unarmed rescuers. All this is constantly approved by superior officers. I strongly urge watching the "Collateral Murder" and the interview with Julian Assange by Amy Goodman that follows.

Time will tell if this WikiLeaks "Afghan Diary" -- clearly the biggest leak since the Vietnam war, and quantitatively the biggest leak in US history -- has any significant effect on the Afghan war and US policy. It may first and foremost have an effect on the US public's and the world's perception of the Afghan enterprise.

It is interesting that Obama's White House Press Secretary hastens to reject and minimize and at the same time condemn these leaks, just as a Press Secretary under any other administration would do. I see no liberalism to distinguish them from the Bush regime in their official approach.

Hopefully this event will provide a considerably wider perspective on the US Afghan war than an up-close film like RESTREPO about troops on the ground; material for any future studies -- or decisions in Congress.

I wish we could see the coverage of this story by the Guardian of London, which appears more vivid and possibly more detailed than that of the NY Times; and Der Spiegel, for that matter, whose approach appears (typically?) more elegant and precise. Certainly the Guardian has given the story a more dramatic play; and apparently it was the Guardian that originally approached WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and sought involvement, and they brought in the NY Times and Der Spiegel. According to David Leigh, the Investigations Editor of the Guardian, interviewed by Amy Goodman on Democracy Now today (July 27, 2010), the Guardian's, and by implication the Brit's, concern is most with the civilian casualties. Leigh think the Times was more focused on what the "Afghan Diary" reveals of the money wasted by the US on Pakistan while the Pakistanis have been playing "a double game," collaborating with the Taliban.

[Johann]

Intelligence isn't so tight, is it?
The Pentagon may be going over those documnents with a fine tooth comb but I think it's more to cover their ass from more scandal than National Security secrets being in jeopardy.

No one would blow the whistle on a bad mission unless it was serious, unless the situtaion was so bad they had no choice.
No one would simply leak this stuff for money or to simply be a thorn in the government's side.
This is to initiate change, to wake some people up.

[Chris Knipp]

Intelligence isn't so tight, is it?
No. That is what "Emmanuel Goldstein" said today to Amy Goodman. Bradley Manning shouldn't have been able to download the 50 documents he's accused of hacking into. But isn't the computer/Internet world through which all information now passes inherently insecure? Hacking networks are also difficult if not impossible to destroy.


The Pentagon may be going over those documnents with a fine tooth comb but I think it's more to cover their ass from more scandal than National Security secrets being in jeopardy.
If have no idea. It's probably both.


No one would blow the whistle on a bad mission unless it was serious, unless the situation was so bad they had no choice.
Doubtless in their judgment, no. The official government response would be to say that it is not theirs to make this decision.


No one would simply leak this stuff for money or to simply be a thorn in the government's side.
This is to initiate change, to wake some people up.
That's their aim, yes. WikiLeaks is non-profit.